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INTRODUCATION 
This report presents the results of a project conducted for the 
Rocky Mountain Forest and Range Experiment Station, U.S. Forest Service. 
This study entitled "Natural Resource valuation - the conceptual and 
operational basis for economic analysis in a mUltiple use context" had 
two objectives: 
1) To develop concepts and procedures for determining com-
parable values of natural resources used in production of 
goods and services that move through markets. Comparability 
must be in terms of (a) theoretical framework and (b) stage 
of production and distribution process. 
2) To develop concepts and procedures for determining comparable 
values of natural resources used in production of goods and 
services that do not move through markets. Comparability 
must be in terms of (a) theoretical framework and (b) stage 
of production and distribution process. 
While conducting this study we operated on several assumptions 
basic to the analysis. (1) The decision-making agencies represent 
society's desire to produce goods and services on public resourcess--
the supply side. (2) The users represent society's desire to consume 
goods and services produced on public resources--the demand side. (3) 
Apparent historical deviations from the above stated assumptions are 
short-run aberrations resulting from grossly imperfect knowledge about 
the physical and economic relations that exist among public resource 
users and uses. (4) Economics can do two things for those making 
decisions about how public resources will be used: (a) determine the 
allocation that will maximize economic benefits and (b) determine 
economic costs resulting from deviations from the max:i.".:ni zing solution. 
GENERAL PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH ALLOCATION DECISIONS 
FOR FOREST LANDS 
Investments in various forest management alternatives have characteris-
tically been made with little attention to refined economic analysis of the 
returns from different projects. This is particularly true of forest 
management investments on public lands. 
Several reasons can be cited why little concern has been given previously 
to determining investment priorities by public forest management agencies. 
First, most public resource management has been on a rather extensive basis 
requiring little new investment. For example, improvement of existing 
forest stands was usually done in conjunction with timber sales. The small 
net investment associated with this type of management was the opportunity 
cost resulting from adjusting cutting practices to improve residual stands 
or aid regeneration rather than obtaining maximum immediate return. Secondly, 
the investments in management that did occur were dictated by policy origi-
nating from 'considerations other than economic. Fire control, insect and 
disease control, and planting were performed because they were thought good 
conservation measures, not necessarily because they were sound investments. l 
Also competition within forest administration agencies for funds for non-
timber uses was not as keen as it is today. Now timber growing must compete 
with many other uses of the forest and for investment funds which must be 
shared with these other uses. 
1 ~a1ey, Ross Samuel. 1968. 
Investments in Michigan. 
Michigan. 
Economic Guidelines fo }~ !imber Management 
Ph.D. Dissertation, T~:", 1:T.~l iversity of 
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Changes within the economic environment within which decisions must be 
made have increased the importance of carefully weighing investment choices. 
As management becomes more intensive, each additional practice yields a 
lower marginal net return, and the difference in rates of return between 
alternatives is likely to become less obvious from cursory examination. 
Public investment decisions based on rules-of-thumb or informal analysis 
are no longer adequate. 
Resource Allocation in the Competitive Market 
A central concept of economics in the capitalisitc world is that the 
price system, operating through the market place, balances supply and demand 
and most efficiently allocates scarce resources among competing uses. This 
results from a series of relationships between producers and consumers. 
These relationships are illustrated in Figures 1 and 2. 
Figure 1 simply illustrates that in the conceptual market relationships, 
firms operate to maximize profits. They do this by certain behavior in the 
market for the factors of production and in the market for the products they 
produce. Similarly consumers enter the goods market and make decisions 
about the purchase of goods and enter the factors market and sell their own 
resources. These decisions are made so as to maximize their well-off-ness 
or utility_ 
Figure 2 illustrates in a little more detail the b~havior ~l1hich will 
accomplish the goals of producers and consumers. It i.;! r ecognized, of 
course, that the simplified system illustrated in th~ _": ~} figures only 
gives an optimum allocation of resources if certain '.:. . " ,~ \~ :lOUS conditions 
are met. It is also recognized tha t the goal of pro f , raaximization can be 
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questioned. Yet despite these considerations this simplified model does 
give (1) a first approximation of the resource allocation process in the 
market and (2) some insight into the nature of price determination and the 
relationship between "price" and "value." That is, price is an equilibrating 
point which at once represents the "value" to the consumer of the marginal 
good sold and the "value" to the producer of the marginal good produced. 
It is this insight into the relationship between price and value that 
these diagrams are useful to our discussion of the problem of resource· 
allocation or investment decision making in the public sector. The public 
land management agencies are producers that need some index of value to allow 
them to make decisions. 
Uniqueness of resource alloeation on public landsl 
Problems of allocating resources (on public forest lands) are of 
special interest because of the fact that many of the products produced have 
not traditionally been sold in the market place, and thus we have no index 
of value similar to that generated by the market system. TIle goods produced 
on public lands often have not been sold because of a certain "publicness u 
associated with these products. 
Let's first examine the "publicness" of some goods and services. It 
is recognized that the market system does not result in an optimum allocation 
of resources in all instances. 2 We, as a body politic, have decided that 
many natural resources fall into the category of an exception and have re-
1 
Much sf the mat:erial 1m abe. introducto-ry statement was also reported .in 
an article "Multiple Use Decision Making--Where Do We Go From Here?" 
Submitted to the Natural Resources Journal. 
2 The kinds of decisions that are most efficiently handled by either the 
market system, the political system, or some central agency are not 
easily delineated. This issue represents a major difference between 
capitalism, socialism, and marxism. 
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moved some decisions regarding these resources from the traditional market 
system and put them under public control. 
Such decisions, for public regulation or ownership of particular kinds 
of resource supplies 9 need not be arbitrary. There are criteria that may 
be used to judge the legitimate "publicness H of any resource allocation de-
cision. These criteria are associated with the instances in which the market 
system does not give the most efficient allocation of resources. l 
One of these instances occurs in conjunction with substantial third 
party benefits. That is, some goods and services such as education, defense, 
mental hospitals, etc. offer benefits beyond those that accure to the direct 
recipient of the service. The market system, which expresses only the demand 
of the direct beneficiaries, tends to under-estimate the values received 
from such services. 
In addition to the above third-party benefits, some commodities are 
associated with indirect social costs. Choice examples are water and air 
pollution. If these social costs are not or cannot be absorbed by the 
producer of the good or its consumer, they may have no influence on the 
price of the commodity, and they then would not be weighed by the market 
system. 
A third justification for public intervention in the form of either 
ownership or cOP-trol of production enterprises occurs with technical mono-
2 
polies. Postal service, telephone service, and transportation are classi-
I 
2 
For a detailed discussion of the appropriate role of the public 
sector the reader should see Edmund S. Phelps (Ed.) Private Wants 
and Public Needs. W. W. Worton & Company Inc.; particularly Walter 
w. Heller's article, "Reflections on Public Expenditure Theory." 
See l1ilton Friedman, "The Role of Government in a Free Society," in 
Phelps, Private Wants and Public Needs. 
1 
I, 
~ 
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fied by some economists as technological monopolies. In a technological 
monopoly, government may have to subsidize production of the commodity to 
insure a supply at a price that meets the demands of society. 
Lastly, government intervention in the market system is often 
considered justified on the basis of substantial differences between the 
time preference of society as a whole and an individual's time preferences. 
This justification rests largely on the greater ability of government to 
absorb uncertainty in investments in such things as basic research. 
Elements of several of the above considerations are relevant to the 
I supply of mUltiple products from the nation's forest lands. For example, 
the conservation issue involves the consumption of limited resources over 
time. It is argued that the time preference of individuals is too limited 
to adequately weigh the intertemporal value of resources, the use of which 
straddles several generations. 
It can also be argued that substantial third party benefits result 
from the production of water and recreation on forest lands. 
This paper, however, argues neither for nor against government ownership 
of vast acreages of forest land. Rather, its purpose is to point out the 
resource allocation problems that result from this public ownership_ Regard-
less of which criteria best justify a public supply of forest-orien~ed goods 
and services, the conclusion for investment purposes is the same. Many of 
the commodities do not command a well-established market demand. No market-
established prices can represent the values of recreation and water invest-
ment analyses. Despite the established markets for timber and forage in many 
parts of the country, there has been little study of how closely administered 
I ' 
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prices of forage approximate market values, nor of how federal timber sale 
appraisal procedures affect the market price of timber from either federal 
lands or competing private lands. Thus, the major problem for mUltiple-use 
decision makers relative to public lands, is the lack of data that are 
needed if the benefits from the production of certain commodities or, even 
more complex, combinations of commodities, are to be evaluated. For some 
products we have no measures of market value. Whenever demand for goods 
and services from public resources is totally, or even partially, free to 
reflect consumers' desires, any mispricing is quite apparent. If over-
pricing exists, disuse of the resource develops; with underpricing "overuse" 
may emerge. This process~ however, offers a decidedly imperfect substitute 
for market values. 
Nevertheless, some possible approaches to natural resource allocation 
or investment decisions ca.~ be proposed. 
Decision Making Techniques 
The most common approach to the dilemma of making decisions without 
value information is to avoid the problem that is, use a method that 
doesn't require value data. Two forms of this approach are: 
1) 
2) 
Establish physical production goals at least cost, 
1 
Maximize physical output for a predetermined level of expenditure. 
These two procedures have had hundreds of illustrations in "public 
forestry" during the past several decades. The forester, for example, may 
have had a specific budget item for tree planting and within the limits of 
his budget he tried to plant as many acres as possible. As a result, the 
1 
See Webster, Henry and Perry Haggenstein, 1963, Economic Analysis of 
Watershed Hanagement Decisions - What Sort of Guides for Land Hanagers" 
Journal of Forestry Vol. 61 No. 9 pp. 631-634. 
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least promising acres were often planted first, because areas such as the 
poorly producing mid-western sand flats offer inexpensive planting oppor-
tunities. Thus, criteria that do not require value data may result in im-
proper investment priorities from any kind of benefit-cost standpoint. 
Investment criteria that make only limited use of product values have 
had some interesting recent applications. U.S. Forest Service researchers 
attempted to develop planning models for mUltiple use management and devised 
the imaginative Resource Allocation }~dels. These models have been success-
fully used with linear programming techniques to determine least-cost solu-
tions for prescribed multiple use goals. The computerized linear program 
solutions have allowed consideration of extremely complex problems involving 
many different kinds of costs and physical outputs. 
Though these Resource Allocation Models presently offer the best solu-
tion to multiproduct output decisions on Forest Service lands, they do not 
incorporate the important policy issues of what are appropriate production 
goals. And solutions to these models depend upon first setting the physical 
production goals. That is, water production, timber cut, or animal unit 
goals must be determined as inputs into the model. The land manager must 
determine what is the optimum output from his lands. Thus, even the newest 
refinements in using cost minimization criteria for solving multiple use 
decisions do little to guarantee an optimum solution based on measures of 
public welfare. 
Still another way to avoid the value problem, which unfortunately has 
been used too often, is to claim that no economically rational solution 
I t 
I 
, t 
, 
,i 
" 
' I 
iJ 
:,' 
, 
I" 
I 
i t 
I t 
, 
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exists. Some would advocate that an uninformed decision in the political 
arena somehow is superior to other decision making techniques. In truth, 
however, the best political solution can only be achieved with information 
regarding benefits and costs. 
A second possibility for solving public investment or allocation deci-
sions is what can be called the macro-economic approach. If a major role 
of public resource utilization is economic development, in its broadest sense, 
then the techniques of simply minimizing costs or maximizing differences 
between benefits and cost may not be appropriate to investment decisions on 
public lands. As Kenneth Boulding states, "The great hiatus in economics • 
• • is a real link between price theory of any kind and a theory of economic 
1 development. If the goal of public resource use is economic development, 
why not deal with the problem more directly and look at the impacts of certain 
allocation decisions on such variables as regional or national income, reg-
ional or national employment, economic stability, etc. 
Though the stated goals of public land management have not explicitly 
included economic development as a central issue, it is implicit in the justi-
fication of certain programs on the basis of stabilizing the livestock in-
dustry or protecting a certain locality's lumber industry. Thus, employment 
and local or regional income considerations do seem to influence public land 
allocation decisions. 
Little or no research has been done concerning the regional or national 
economic impacts of alternative forest land uses. Only recently has some 
study been directed toward measuring and predicting the impacts of dams and 
1 
Boulding Kenneth E., 1963. The Uses of Price Theory in Models of 
Markets. Edited by Alfred R. Oxenfeldt, New York, Columbia Uni-
versity Press, 371 p. 
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other water developments on surrounding communities. One thing apparent from 
these few studies is the extreme difficulty of accurately measuring the 
regional impacts from even multimillion dollar projects. 
The size of the region over which impacts are expected has considerable 
influence on our ability to identify changes due to specific investments. 
If the relevant region is large, for example a state, one might logically 
conclude that most measures of macro-economic variables lack sufficient sen-
sitivity to assess changes resulting from the relatively small investments 
that characterize forest lands or from shifts in land use patterns. If, 
however, we are interested in measuring impacts on smaller units such as 
communities, the techniques available, which include input output analysis 
or economic base analysis, do not seem particularly appropriate for measuring 
the economic interrelationships that exist within small rural areas. The 
strong economic dependence of the region under study on distant urban centers 
tends to cloud the intraregional economic picture. 
The macro-economic (or regional analysis) models for making multiple 
use decisions seem to have three major shortcomings. First, they are not 
sufficiently sensitive to measure changes associated with small investments. 
Second, they do not come to grips with the major policy issue of how 
much should be invested in the various kinds of development that are pos-
sible on public forest lands. At best, we can set criteria that require 
maximizing the level of employment for a given budget or obtaining a given 
level of employment at a minimum cost. These use-optimization techniques 
do not solve the problem of how much money should be invested in various 
development or use combinations on public lands. 
Third, in dealing with aggregate figures for income or employment, we 
often ignore the problems of income distribution. An apparent increase in 
-12-
regional income may equate with decreased income and employment in other 
regions. Changes in land use patterns may generate interregional flows of 
income or they may change the relative contributions of the public and private 
sectors in supplying resources. 
Considering the shortcomings 9 most economists would agree that the best 
approach toward ranking alternative land uses would require some attempt to 
evaluate the difference or ratios between benefits and costs. If evaluation 
of benefits in relationship to costs is thG appropriate criterion, then many 
analytical models came to the fore. Benefit-cost ratios, internal rates of 
return, and joint production models equating marginal rates of substitution 
between goods, are all methods that can be used to compare benefits and 
costs of various investment schemes. 
Though the mechanics of performing these kinds of analysis are relatively 
simple, they have been little used in analyzing public investment. The 
attempts by the Corps of Engineers and Bureau of Reclamation to apply these 
methods could at best be called incomplete unsatisfactory efforts to compare 
benefits and costs. The dissatisfaction associated with this use stems 
from the difficulty of assigning a quantitative measure to benefits derived 
from non-market supplied goods and services. In many instances two of the 
most important products from water development (and likewise from forest 
development) are recreation and water for domestic use. Yet neither of these 
outputs has an established market value which can be plugged into investment 
analyses. Methods that approach multiple use decisions from a profit maximi-
zing standpoint have therefore been little used because of the lack of value 
figures for many of the benefits. 
This lack has promoted considerable recent research on the problem of 
resource values. Most of this has dealt with problems of recreation valuation. 
-13-
Status of Resource Valuation 
Before examining the status of resource valuation, it is important to 
clarify precisely what kind of value we are seeking. l1any of the critics of 
current research in resource valuation are not fully aware of the problems 
of setting on a particular resource use. Those critics seem to assume 
that every good or service has an inherent value peculiar to it, and that 
it is the role of the researcher to find this single unique value for 
each resource use. This concept of a single inherent value for each commodity 
is false. Every good and service has several values. Each has a value in 
exchange. That is, how many goods can be obtained by means of giving up or 
exchanging one unit of the commodity in question. Each good or service 
also has a unique value for each individual consumer. This is the amount 
that the individual's psychic welfare is improved through owning or consuming 
the particular commodity. A good has a third value that equates with its 
cost of production. 
The fallacy is therefore obvious in an assumption that a particular 
resource has only one unique value, and that the researcher has but to gaze 
into a crystal ball to find this heretofore hidden number. Rather, deter-
mining a value for a particular recreation experience or for the domestic 
consumption of water is a problem solved by arriving at an index number 
(expressed in dollars) that approximates one of the above measures of value. 
Therefore, the many values of a particular resource may each have a possible 
application in some resource allocation model. The only valid grounds for 
criticizing a particular proxy value determined through research are: (1) 
that it is an index of a value not applicable to a particular allocation 
model, or (2) that through a flaw in concept or methodology, the index is 
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not an accurate approximation of the value being estimated. Many researchers 
can and should be criticized, however, for not explicitly stating just what 
kind of value they are trying to approximate. Without this definition, it 
is impossible to evaluate the prospective usefulness or accuracy of their 
estimates. 
Most of the research currently directed at valuing non-market supplied 
resources has been devoted to putting a dollar value on recreation. To date 
several general kinds of approaches have been applied to the problem. These 
1 
have included: 
1 
2 
3 
Expenditure Method - measures the value of recreation in terms of the 
total expenditures of recreation. 
Gross National Product Method - attempts to measure the contribution of 
recreation to GNP. 
Consumers' Surplus Method - attempts to determine the willingness of in-
dividuals to pay for various quantitites of 
recreation. Instrumental in this method is 
develop~ng ~ hypothetical demand curve for 
recreat1on. 
Cost Method - uses the cost of supplying recreational facilities as a 
measure of the benefits derived therefrom. 
Market Value Method - uses fees charged at private resorts as a proxy 
value for the value of public-supplied facilities. 
Monopoly Revenue Method - uses the estimated revenue that would be ob-
tained by a monopolist owning the recreational 
site as a measure of benefits. 3 
For a more complete description of the various methods mentioned see 
Lerner, Lionel, J., 1962, Quantitative indices of recreational values. 
Economics in Outdoor Recreational Policy, Report Number II, Western Agricul-
tural Economics Research Council, Committee on the Economics of Water 
Resources Development. 
Wennergren, E. Boyd, 1964. Valuing Non-market Priced Recreational Resources. 
Land Economics, August 1964. 
Bro~, William G., Ajmer Singh and Emery Castle~ 1964. An Economic Evalua-
t on of the Oregon Salmon and Stee1head Sport Fishery. Oregon Agricultural 
Experiment Station Technical Bulletin 78, September 1964. 
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Apparently, there is no dearth of ways to try to evaluate recreation. 
These methods or modifications of them can be used in valuing other resource 
uses. Yet there has only been limited success when the calculated values 
are inserted in resource allocation models. Although we have made in-roads 
at developing individual resource values, we have yet to develop value 
systems which allow analysis of complex combinations of resources and re-
source uses. Even though each of the above valuation schemes has its appro-
priate use in isolated circumstances, their application in resource alloca-
tion models must be evaluated on the bases of: 
1. their appropriateness for measuring benefits in terms of the opti-
mization criteria of the allocation model. 
2. the comparability of all measures of value in the allocation model. 
It is impossible to approach an optimum solution if cattle, timber, 
recreation, and water are all measured by different indices of value. 
3. whether the value scheme is empirically quantifiable. 
Where to From Here? 
An orderly approach to mUltiple use decision-making requires a re-
orientation of research toward a broader approach to the development of 
resource allocation and investment models. 
The initial stage of this project was thus concerned with developing 
values of goods from forest lands which would be comparable theoretically 
and also useful in allocation models. This problem seems to be divisible 
into two rather distinct parts: (1) the role that "demand" plays in the 
value process, and (2) the role that "supply" plays in the value process. 
To our knowledge, this is the first research which has attempted to 
come to grips with both of these aspects of the role that valuation plays 
.. 16-
in decision making. Previous research in -valuing recreation, for example, 
usually concentrated on the de_ad side of the valuation equation without 
explicit consideration af the supply side of the equation. Similarly most 
of the research developing allocation models do not explicitly deal with 
the valuation problem. 
We hope that the following is a conceptual contribution, and we will 
conclude with a description of research needs to test the models developed. 
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DEMAND ANALYSIS FOR GOODS AND SERVICES 
PRODUCED ON FOREST LANDS 
Traditional demand theory characterizes the quantity of a good or 
service demanded by consumers as a function of price. Further, the law 
of demand states that the amount of a good or service demanded increases 
with a fall in price and diminishes with a rise in price. Thus, the 
inverse relationship between price and quantity demanded can be described 
as ahown in Figure 1 where DD represents the traditional demand curve. 
p 
D 
·D 
O~------------------------------Q 
Figure 1. A hypothetical mar~et demand curve (DD) 
The negative slope of DD is due to the diminishing marginal utility of the 
good or service in question. Utility per unit decreases as an individual 
acquires more of a commodity. In the abstract demand is a static con-
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cept. Although only one point is observable at any given point in time, 
economists act as though the whole curve were known. 
In this simplified expression of demand the quantity of Good X con-
sumed is uniquely dependent on the price of X ruling in the market. In 
order to obtain such a simple representation of quantity of Good X 
demanded in a market consisting of a given group of consumers, the follow-
ing assumptions must be made: 
Q = f(P, £, X, 1, Po) 
Where P = price of the commodity X 
C - number of consumers 
T = tastes and preferences of consumers for all goods sold in the 
market 
I = consumer income 
Po = prices of all other commodities 
C, T, I and Po are fixed and known 
From this expression of market conditions the symbolic demand function for 
X can be written as x = f(p), where x and p are in definite units and 
represent the quantity of X taken by consumers and the market price of X 
respectively. Variables x and p take on positive values only. 
It is desirable at this point to go behind the market demand curve 
and see how it is developed. The market demand curve is made up of indivi-
dual demand curves. At any given price the total quantity of X taken in 
the market is nothing more than the horizontal summation of the quantities 
demanded by individual consumerso If we want to know more about the 
market demand curve we must investigate t he individual demand curves. 
The goods and services that an individual can purchase are limited 
by his income and wealth and by prices at which goods and services are 
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made available. Subject to these limitations the individual chooses 
which goods and services to purchase. In doing so, the individual makes 
decisions which maximize his "utility", where "utility" is a common 
characteristic of all goods and services. For example, consider n consumer 
goods (Xl' X2, X3---, Xn). Let one form of the utility function of the 
individual be U = (Xl' X2, X3,---, Xn). The individual having a given 
income, I , can purchase goods at uniform market prices (PI' P2' p3,---,pn). 
Purchases are made so that U has a maxtmum value subject to the conditions 
expressing the fact that he must balance his budget: 
XlPl + X2P2 + X3P3 + --- + XnPn = I 
If the individual consumer is to maximize his utility function subject 
to the above restraint, it can be shown mathematically (1) by using 
Lagrangian multipliers that the following result must be obtained: 
+ UXn 
Pn 
Then the individual has allocated his income among goods, Xl. X2, 
X3, --- Xn, so that marginal utility per unit of income is equal among 
all goods and services consumed. 
The market demand curve in its simplified form represents the sum 
of all individual demand curves in the market, which in turn represent 
consumer choices relative to prices for some given time period. And, as 
Marshall stated: 
1 
If_ - - But in the long run the price which a trader or manufacturer 
can afford to pay for a thing depends on the prices which consumers 
pay for it, or for the things made by and of it. The ultimate 
regulator of all demand is therefore consumers' demand.,,1 
Marshal, Alfred. 1947. 
London. 92 page • 
Principle of Economics. HacMiIlan and Co. 
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The Competitive Market 
In a purely competitive market, supply and demand conditions deter-
mine market prices for all goods and services entering the market. 
In any specific market area the consumer can buy a given product from a 
number of firms. If all firms are equally convenient and sell products 
of comparable quality and if buyers 1.ncur similar amounts of non-market 
costs, etc., then price is the criterion used by the consumer to make 
decisions concerning income allocation. When prices are equal and the 
"ceteris paribus" assumptions hold, then the consumer is indifferent as 
to where purchases are made. However, if any of the above assumptions 
are relaxed, then price becomes only one of the determinants of demand, 
and the quantity of Good X demanded by the consumer from a particular 
firm or all firms is now a function of price and the other variable(s) 
allowed to change. No one will travel outside a market area for the sole 
purpose of buying a product he could have purchased in a closer market for 
the same price. To do so would be irrational b~cause of additional travel 
costs. Prices between market areas normally differ by the cost of trans-
portation and added handling costs from point of production 
Let us consider traditional community markets where the consumer is 
. in 
several overlapping market areas (Figure 2). First, consider the case 
where acquisition costs for Consumer C are approximately equal at Stores 
Mlt '2' or M3, because C is an equal distance from all three markets. 
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Figure 2. Three assumed markets in a traditional market situation 
Price differentials properly determine the place of purchase. Where 
price in MI >M2<M3, the consumer would shop at Market M2. Now let us con-
sider another case where Consumer C is located at varying distances from 
, , 
three sources, MI , M2 and M3 , and sale prices are equal. In this case 
acquisition co~ts determine the place of purchase and C would shop at M3 • 
The traditional demand function q = f(P} can be restated for this situa-
tion as q = f(P, Ac) where Ac is acquisition costs in addition to price. 
It is evident that where consumers are located at various distances 
from the market there are costs incurred in addition to price which 
influence an individual's willingness to consume. Price is but one 
variable which affects his income allocation. A more applicable variable 
to analyze consumer demand for this type of market situation is user cost 
(ue). 
A consumer of goods and services produced on a national forest is 
exactly analogous to the second case described in Figure 2. For goods and 
services produced on national forests, acquisition costs become more domi-
nant in decision-making as distance to the product source increases. The 
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cost of using (consuming) national forest products is not just the price 
at the site, which for some products is zero, but involves all costs to 
consume. Thus, the common denominator used in this paper is user cost and 
is measured at the gate of the first user--the lumber mill, the rancher, 
the hunter, the canal company, the hiker, etc. 
User Cost Theory 
The idea of user costs stem from the theory of equi-marginal value 
in use principle which asserts that economic goods and services have 
measurable value. The word "value" has often been used to express differ-
ent viewpoints. Adam Smith said: 
"The word value, it is observed, has two different meanings, 
and sometimes expresses the utility of some particular 
object, and sometimes the power of purchasing other goods 
which the possession of that object conveys. The one may 1 
be called 'value in use'; the other, 'value in exchange'." 
Through almost universal acceptance of the value in use principle, 
a product or service has value which is measured as the maximum amount 
of dollars which a user will be willing to pay for that unit. Marginal 
value in use is the value of the last unit consumed. The principle of 
marginal value in use further asserts that an efficient allocation of 
resources exists between users and uses when the values in use of the 
marginal units are equal for each user and use. I f marginal value i n 
use of a resource is not equal between uses or between users, then 
resources must be free to move from one use to another or from one user 
I 
Smith Adam, 1776. Wealth of Nations. Gateway Edition, Herney 
Regnary Co. Chicago Illinois, 1953. 
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to another until no advantage is to be had from trading before resources 
are correctly allocated. 
Acceptance of the value in use principle is a stepping stone which 
permits further development of the concept referred to in this paper as 
user cost. Since consumers allocate their fixed income among gODds and 
services in such a way that total utility derived is at a maximum, it 
appears feasible to measure value in use as total outlay of dollars 
needed to consume goods and services. In this light ~vhat an individual 
pays to consume non-market-priced goods as well as market-priced goods 
is evidence of value in use. Equating marginal value in use and user 
cost is diagrammed in Figure 3. The individual consumer will attempt to 
Marginal 
value in 
use 
"- - . 
ue .1 t- ----
j 
o 
i 
1 
.. ;. ...... -
Q. 
user 
cost 
Q 
Figure 3. Marginal value in use and user cost relationship 
consume Qo of the product at User Cost UC. Only restraints such as lack 
~f capital or limited supply of Q will prohibit him from doing so. User 
cost includes all costs which would not have been incurred had the good 
or service not been consumed. These expenditures by the consumer are 
measures of satisfaction or personal benefits derived from consumption 
and are eVident from his willingness to pay. The sum of all user costs 
are total economic benefits since it includes the expenses paid by all 
consumers to all other individuals providing goods and services to the 
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consumer. 
Society obviously benefits from expenditures made for the use of 
national forest resources and if maximization of economic benefits is the 
goal, then goods and services should be allocated to users so the following 
function is maximized: 
n 
\. .-,... .. -.- -. 
EB = L -. 
i=1 
where 
EB = economic benefits 
UC = user cost 
i = various products (1, 2, 3, --- n) produced on the 
national forests 
Goods and services produced on national forests are heterogenous 
from the standpoint of location of consumption. Some are consumed on the 
site, some are removed from the forest and used as inputs in the produc-
tion of other goods or services, while others are used but never consumed. 
It becomes necessary, therefore, for logical consistency in the valuation 
process to establish a starting point for user cost measurement. This 
point we call the Ugate of the first user" and it represents the point at 
which costs are first incurred in the consumption of national forest 
products. The user gate for the recreationalist is his home, for the 
grazer of domestic livestock it is his ranch; for the logger it is his 
mill, etc. The user cost for the sawmill could be computed as follows: 
UCT = tel + C2 + C3 + --- + Cn 
where 
UCT = total user cost per 1000 board feet in logs at the mill 
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In Figure 4 a graphical presentation of a total user cost curve is 
shown. The least cost, 
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Figure 4 Hypothetical total user cost curve for a given resource 
Oa, is incurred by those users nearest the site, part of which could be 
a fee charge. Thus, the total user cost curve will not indicate on output 
higher than Ql unless the Mil per dollar of expenditure increases for some 
or all users. The assumption here is that users equate marginal user 
costs to marginal utility derived from use of the resource. Thus, any fee 
change or any other alteration i n user costs associated with a given level 
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of resource use will shift the derived curve. An increase in fees~ for 
example, will cause some users to leave the market and reduce the quantity 
of use of resource x. Likewise, any decrease in user 'costs will encourage 
more use of the resource. Thes e shifts can occur in the absence of any 
shift in individual demand. 
A total user cost curve permits valuation of a resource on the basis 
of what users are actually paying to obtain its use -- it must be worth 
at least that much. On National Forests where multiple products are 
produced,TUC curves can be derived for each use . Some of these resources 
are associated with prescribed use levels (sustained yield, etc.). User 
cost curves can be useful aids to incremental investment decisions by 
guiding investment to those uses where public expenditures per dollar 
of investment is highest. 
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Summary 
The user cost approach has many of the pitfalls that other approaches 
have when used for resource evaluation and allocation purposes. However, 
it does provide a framework for analysis of resource allocation in a 
multiple use setting. User cost is not so different from the usual price 
found in traditional markets and it plays the same role in the allocation 
model that price normally plays. It does have an advantage in the present 
contest in that it can be determined empirically for every product or 
service harvested from the national forests. The gate of the first user 
provides a consistent point to measure user costs. At that gate all the 
pressures in the economy culminate in the consumer's decision as to when, 
how much, and where he will consume all goods and services available to 
him. The basic premise underlying user cost is that resources should be 
evaluated on the basis of their value in use. Thus, the theory of the 
consumer in equating marginal utility per dollar spent in all directions 
is basic to the user cost model as it is in traditional demand ana1ysis. 
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SUPPLY ANALYSIS FOR GOODS AND SERVICES 
PRODUCED ON FOREST Lfu~S 
The process of making goods and services from public resources 
available to the consuming public is no longer a costless one. In some 
cases the costs of supplying these goods may be quite small, consisting 
of administration costs and minimal other expenses. The maintenance of 
a hiking trail in a wilderness may be such a service. Yet~ as public 
natural resources become more scarce or the demand on them increases, the 
costs of supplying these goods and services are certain to increase. As 
costs of supplying resources increase they must play a critical role in 
allocation and investment decisions. 
In the introductory section, the point was made that the traditional 
market price is simply an "equilibrating point which at once represents 
the 'value' to the consumer of the marginal good purchased and the 'value' 
to the producer of the marginal good produced. 1f The importance of both 
supply and demand conditions in the generation of values from a resource 
system was emphasized. The Supply equal Demand condition implies a myriad 
of things to economists. Comprehension of some of those requires a firm 
understanding of the theory of supply_ 
In what follows the theory of supply is reviewed; the supply situation 
on public lands as we see it is described; and finally a theoretical 
supply model that seems appropriate to ~ pseudo-closed resource,l such as 
Beaver Creek Watershed. i 
, s suggested. 
1 
The term 'pseudo-closed resource system" refers to a management unit 
such as a for t 
. es or watershed such as Beaver Creek. The assumption, 
which 18 somewhat ,.. . . 
market in i .unrea~1st1c, is that th1S management un1t serves a 
to the ts ent1rity. This allows us to aDply market type analysis 
system. • 
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Supply Theory 
A simple definition of a supply function is a positively sloping 
curve relating quantities offered to price. This definition leaves one 
with very little useful information. An alternative definition is 
available if the problem is approached from the producer's side of the 
questions. 
Conventional price theory tells us that a producing firm will supply 
its output in accord with that part of its marginal cost schedule (Me) 
1 
which lies above its average variable cost curve (AVe) where Me = 6TC/6X. 
This condition is illustrated by figure I. 
$ He 
Figure I. 
This definition still leaves one with little information and a sterile 
concept of supply. What is needed is a clear definition of marginal cost. 
(A&B) 
(1) 
Consider a production function with one output (Q) and two inputs 
Q = f (A,B) 
1 It . 
1S important to recall that the definition of variable costs 
depends upon the long-run short-run consideration. In this instance, 
I suggest that it is a long-run we are dealing with. 
(2) 
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The respective marginal products of A and B ~re defined as: 
MPP = aQ/aA 
A 
MPP B =aQI aB 
From conventional price theorY9 we can then define the marginal 
cost of production in equalibrium as: 
(3) 
or 
He = PAl MPP A = PB/MPPB 
MC = PA/aQ/aA = PB/aQ/aB 
By proceeding with the above demonstration, we have clearly focused 
our attention on the fact that the marginal costs and thus the supply 
function of a firm are derived directly from the production function faced 
by the firm. How does this concept of supply compare to situations in 
resource management? 
Public Resource Supply 
Ultimately, we will define the supply function of a closed resource 
system such as Beaver Creek in a very rigorous manner, but first we should 
examine the concepts of supply now commonly held by various groups. These 
concepts are illustrated in Figure II below. 
. $ . 
i 
"SH 
I 
1 
I 
I 
I 
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"5" is the concept of supply most commonly held by resource managers. 
This function describes the allowable cut or range allotment situation. 
"s" is clearly not related to the concept of economic supply discussed 
above, but has economic. implications. "s,. is administratively set so as 
t~ agree with the administrator's pre-set objectives. Its position has 
little to do with market or economic phenomenon. 
"s" can more realistically be considered a quota usually determin~d 
by means of biological criteria. Allowable cut is generally an annual 
cutting recommendation based on an attempt to harvest growth plus a correction 
for adjusting the timber stand in the direction of a "regulated condition." 
Likewise grazing allotments a~e usually determined by some estimate of a 
sustainable amount of forage production. Generally,allowable cut or allow-
able grazing are quotas or biological limits which can be met with a 
minimum of direct investment of funds. 
These consumption limits or quotas are not affected by the cost of 
producing the resource and thus appear as a vertical line. That is~ output 
doesn't vary with the costs of production or the price of the commodity 
in the market. 
Supply a Function of Investment 
/s, on the other hand» defines a supply function quite similar to the 
concept of economic supply described above. lve are assuming a production 
function of the form 
(4) 
(5 ) 
Q = f (Investment) 
where MPP1NV =aQ/aINV 
Me = p laQ/aI1~ 
INV 
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Critical examinat:ion of S reveals that it too is un~cceptable a~ 
an explanation of economic supply. S clearly begs the confounding 
problem of opportunity costs so prevalent in public resource allocation. 
1 questions. 
Since opportunity costs are important in resou.rce allocation 
decisions, some consideration of them is vitalo 
SupplY and Opportunitv Costs 
Where ~8es of a public reSource compete, production of on,e implies 
non-production, at least to some degree, of others. That is, there are 
opportunity costs associated with every investment decision. The production 
function is not merely 
Q1 = f (Investment). 
It 1s more like 
(6) 
QI = f (Investment ~ Q2' Q3' .•• ~). 
This In tum yields a marginal cost function "lldch ic quite diffe-r.en~ 
from 
(7) Me :: PI/aQ/aINV 
as defined above. 
Clearly, we now have 8 total cost function of the . form: 
(8) TC - (Investment Costs) + (Opportunity) 
1 
It is informat~v t d· 
1 1 .... e Q ~scuss the point Q in Figure II. Q is the eve of 8ustainabl d 0 o · 
of with e .; co e pro uction the untreated biotic sy~tem i;~ q-tpable 
the - ~ ro .nveutment ~ The locati on of this obviously dep~nds · upon pnys~cal n t ,. . , . " 
note th t "s" a ure or the system considered. It is interesting to 
to the ~eft 0 (the pLes~nt administered supply) could be set eiiper 
ide of Q r right of Qo • Assigning "s" a position on either 
are not dO opens the door to a number of questions but since they 
irectly reI . ' evant to what follc~'7s they will not be con$>tder$~ . 
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This in turn yields us a marginal cost function for Q1 of the form: 
(9) Me =dTC/dQl =dI~~/aQI +dOPP/dQl 
A Revised Supply Function 
For simplicitY9 assume a two-good system in which production is 
defined by a curvilinear production function embodying the assumption 
of diminishing returns. l 
1 
2 
The for good one (Ql)' 
Mel =aTC/dQI =a+eQl = Pl6Q2 
wheredINV/aQl =a+BQl 
2 d OPPC/dQ1 = -P26Q2 
P2 = price of Q2 
This then yields a supply function for Q similar to tha-t of Figure III. 
1 
$ 
. ' --
- -<Ill .. 
.--; .. .. 
-P26Q2 +a +SQl = Me = s 1 1 
-----..- - .--_.. Q
l 
Figure III 
Note that the cOli dimini urvl. near production function and the assumption of 
A kShing returns are not essential to the discussion that follows. 
mar. et equilibrium normally would still be attained without these 
assumptions. . -
The term - P6Q °11 ° c: Ii 2 Wl. satl.sfy the alternative good relationships (i.e. 
amp mentary, competitive, non-related). 
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Implicit in this argument is the fact that for every level of Q2 
production, there corresponds a different supply function for Q1e This 
is illustrated by Figure IV. 
$ 
Figure IV 
Ec:ailibrium Value 
If we add a demand function for Q1 to the system, a pseudo-market 
equilibrium price is generated for each possible production level of Q2-
This is the conventional market analysis of price theory as demonstrated 
in Figure V. 
, S = f (Q )2 $1_ -.. ~.-.--."" .... - 1 2 
... ---. .... 1 
, ".. . ..... , . __ ,-. .---- S = f (Q ) 1- . ,. -- ::.:--:-"< 1 2 
I _ .__ .. i . ' ' '-. .. ~"~ ! i . 
.....L.------Q 
1 
Figure V 
Since this is the variable (equilibrium price) of coneerf1, it ll7o.1d 
seem that we have a possible scheme for analysis. 
The Model 
From the above discussion it is obvious that a complete system 
WOuld consist of a production function~ a supply function, and a d~mand 
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function for each good. This in essence is th~ basi~ for t .he _.supplY 
model. 
For simplicity we ag::lin assume a two-good system. We further will 
assume that all the inputs (Ai) of the production function 
Qi == f (AL , 1.2 ' •• • , An ' Q~,) k f. i 
can be grouped into one variable called Investment. (INV). 
This system can then be defined by a set of eight (8) · s~D1ult411~O~S 
equations: a production function, e supply function, a demald fu~ction, 
plus a supply-equal-demand identtty for each good. 
(II) 
(12) 
(13) 
(14) 
(15) 
(16) 
(17) 
(18) 
where 
Symbolically these equations are : 
Qi = f (INVI , Q~) 
QP :: f (INV2, QP) 2 1 
Qd = f (P 1) 1 
d Q2 = f (P2) 
QS = f (PL , Q~) 1 
QS = f (F2, QP) 2 1 
QS 
1 
= Qd 
1 
QS 
2 
::: Qd 
2 
QP ;:: 
i 
quantity of i the good produced 
OS 
-1 == 
H 
" 
If Ii I i supp\ i pd 
Q~ :: .. " H H II demanded ~ 
.. ~. , 
pi :: price of the i th good 
INVi = var~aQle investment costs of pr9ductio~ aS$oGiated with the 
i th good. 
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The system is characterized by eight (8) endogenous variables: 
Which is consistent with the eight equations defined. 
Conclusions 
This system would generate the equilibrium values of the several 
products. The main thrust of the system is an attempt to approximate 
a market supply function which is vital to the allocation model we are 
hypothesizing. 
The supply function generated by the system will be more complete 
than past attempts in that it not only considers the variable costs of 
production but also the opportunity costs so prevalent in public resource 
management decisions. 
The model presented seems to be theoretically sound. It will 
generate an efficient allocation of resources at the ~and in the 
case hypothesized,at the market level. Of course, there is the ever 
present question concerning violation of the perfect competition 
assumption. Obviously the worth of the model will depend to some degree 
on the extent of violence done to this often attacked assumption. 
DepeDriing upon one's !"e 'luirements for the definition of a competitive 
market, t 1-!e assumption will nor- or will be a ec2;n:c?b l.e. If one insists on 
the tex~ book list of criteria (many finltB., :.: .... _:, .... ·1.;1..".,ers, etc.) the 
assumption will rarely b-e accepted. If,- on thf: .; .' 4.=: _ hand, one is 
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interested in the effective results of the market process (MC of ~roduction = 
marginal value in use), the assumption will be acceptable in many cases. 
Further discussion of this point is not warranted in this paper, since 
justification or negation of this approach to analysis of market structure 
rapidly degenerates into parroting of one's educated biases. 
Even if one grant~ the empirical validity of the proposed model, 
the empirical infeasibility of the system should be a sufficient block 
buster to satify critics. 
The production function is obviously the central building block of 
the system, and the absence of mUltiple input-output models from the 
empirical horizon is evidence of the problem. Adequate data for such an 
involved estimation procedure is just not available. Consider the multiple 
input two output model suggested. The system defined eight endogenous 
variables. Couple this with a minimum of twenty or thirty exogenous 
variables and the problem becomes obvious. To obtain any significant 
silmultaneous estimation of the system's parameters would reguire 
fifty to one hundred observations in all probability. Anyone acquainted 
with the data available for natural resource systems will recognize the 
almost insurmountable task of acquiring a number of observations even 
approaching this. 
The question of existence of stable production functions may also 
be raised. Some imply that even if all the data needed were available, 
the functions could not be estimated. This seems to be an unfounded 
Conclusion. In a world where cause and effect are accepted by most, 
the complexity of the function.s~ not their existence:op would seem to be 
the problem or point of debate. 
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This implies that with a fully specified model and adequate data, the 
function could be estimated. In the case of some human behavior~ the 
functions may be so complex as to render them practically useless. 
Production functions on the other hand do not seem to warrant the same 
conclusion. The problem, therefore, would seem to be data alone. 
At any rate, in the context of the proposed model, the apparent 
inavailability of appropriate production functions forces us to retreat 
to the ttaditional concept of natural resource supply (i.e. administratively 
set supply "s" of Figure II). 
t~lat does this imply for the proposed model? It implies questions 
of significant proportion. The basis of support for the proposed model 
was implicitely traditional efficiency criteria. That is, marginal costs 
in production should equal rnargj.nal value in use. Since ItS" involves no 
consideration of the costs of production directly~ the efficiency 
conditions will not be defined by the model unless it is by chance. This 
leaves us on very unsure footing. TIle only conclusion possible is that 
the supply curve will intersect the user cost curve some where. The 
meaning of thiS point is unclear from a welfare point of view. It does~ 
however, define a price or value index of some sort. The possibility 
exists that a "politically" or "administratively" determined inelastic 
supply curve in addition to considering marginal costs of production also 
considers social opportunity costs and thus is a closer approximation of 
a "public supply curve". 
-39-
NEEDED RESEARCH 
The model proposed incroporates concepts not currently used in 
forest service decision making. Thus, data are available only in 
bits and pieces. Yet, there may well be more data available than commonly 
thought. 
Data Needs-Supply 
Ideally, estimates of single use production functions for any site 
being studies are needed. Also derived estimates of input substitution 
relations among all uses as well as product substitution relations among 
all uses are necessary. With these physical functions, the associated 
benefits and costs~ and a computer program, testing the model is possible. 
Obviously, the ideal is far from a reality and will be for some time. Still, 
most decisions in life are based upon something less than perfect informa-
tion. The use of a rational technique and limited data produces rational 
decisions. Even though the error may be large, it will normally be smaller 
than it would be if based on an irrational technique. 
Generally, physical relationships such as production or substitution 
functions are curvilinear in the range where economics enters the decision-
making process. Linear relations are the exception rather than the rule, 
and it is doubtful if there are many linear cases among the uses made of 
public forest lands. Of course, it would be desirable to have data over 
the whole range of each functi0 n. Though these data are not currently 
av °1 b a~ a Ie, if we can find poi:"'~. q a;:\d specify an appropriate mathematical 
fUnction, some of these econo!l!.'~;:. relationships can be estimated. The 
Forest Service and State Experi n'..ent Stations have some points established 
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from which a supply function can be synthesized for several uses and 
several sites. Physical data will be relatively more difficult to generate 
than the cost data related to supply extending or shifting. 
Data Needs-Demand 
The demand function (UC) for each use for a given site will have to 
be estimated from data obtained from the society of users. Samples, 
survey questionnaires, and on-site checks as well as secondary sources 
will need to be employed. Since we are concerned with a synthesized test 
of the model at this time, a relatively small user area would be selected 
in order to minimize the costs of obtaining data . 
Estimates of a UC function for each use for a given area can be made 
with considerably more confidence than can estimates of supply costs 
because more pOints along the s i gnificant range in the functions can be 
determined. Also, there is already considerable experience in estimating 
these functions for some uses. 
Identifying the Restrictions 
The allocation decision depends not only upon UC and supply costs, 
but also upon physical and institutional limitations. A major limitation 
is the allowable harvest limit on the supply side. For most traditional 
uses administr ative decisi.ons , budget restrictions, experience, and 
research have established it . 
HakinL_ ·:. :1t:: System Operational 
Finding the data neede,). -:.S only par t of the testing problem. Se1ect-
the analytical syst em t ~: :: r. Fi l l be~t accommodate t he data , provide the 
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maximizing allocation solution, and be practical for field use is equally 
difficult. Obviously, computers will have to be employed to handle the 
many inputs required by the allocation problem. Alternative systems need 
to be tried in the testing stage and the results of each need to be studied 
in relation to the logic of the model $ 
Application to field problems will vary in complexity; some sites 
will have all use possibilities; some will serve people from allover the 
country; and some will accommodate many techniques for producing the 
product or service. Such a complex problem may require a national study 
i 
program usin~ a large computer. A site with only one or two uses, serving 
~ , 
a local ~ommunity, and having only one or two ways of doing the job might 
>}; -
be studied by a qualified man with a program and a calculator. Data for 
intermediate problems could be sent to a regional computer center for 
analysis. 
Programs for computers and selection of the analytical techniques to 
satisfy the requirements of the model need to be specified and tested 
during the research program. We argue that such activities are part of 
the research process and in the end will save time and money and help 
standardize the decision-making processes. 
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